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Twin Towers and Amoy Gardens1: mobilities, risks and choices 
Stephen Little, Open University Business School, U.K. 
Introduction: 
This chapter looks at two events that, by replacing predictability with uncertainty, 
increased the perceived risk of travel and changed collective understandings of the 
relationship between place, transport and accessibility. The events demonstrated the 
vulnerability of core urban systems to threats previously regarded as problems of the 
periphery. 
 
Just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor represented a pivotal point in U.S. foreign 
relations and ultimately the emergence of a Pacific Century, so the attack on the 
World Trade Center towers already represents a pivotal point in the relationship of the 
United States to the international community. 9/11 shifted the paradigm of hijacking 
which had become almost institutionalised in North America. The expectation, 
established in the nineteen sixties and seventies, that political hijackers would seize 
aircraft in order to make specific demands had been overturned by the time the fourth 
aircraft hijacked on 9/11 crashed during an attempt by passengers to regain control. 
The attacks triggered an immediate shut-down of U.S. aviation which had 
consequences for both U.S. inter-urban travel and for the global civil aviation system.  
 
The disruption of international travel and trade caused by the SARS outbreak in 2003 
was equally damaging for the global economy and impacted equally on transport and 
communications across East Asia. The rapid diffusion of SARS across and beyond 
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East Asia led to a significant impact on investor confidence, tourism and business 
travel and was equally disruptive in economic terms. As with the disruption of 
commerce and trade in New York, companies operating in Hong Kong suspended 
operations and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) implemented a disaster 
recovery operation with a backup trading floor at an alternate location. 
 
This chapter examines the implications of these traumatic events for the key issues for 
transport policy and individual decision making. The continuing “war on terror” holds 
significant implications for longer distance travel and international mobility, however, 
heightened perception of the risk of terrorism and disease produced responses of 
relevance to both long distance and local transport. 
 
The proposition that the price of mobility is eternal surveillance is examined through a 
consideration of risk perception, the mechanisms of recovery and response and their 
consequences. 
Reframing Mobility 
 
The consequences of 9/11continue with varying levels of alert and conflicting 
demands for security innovations ranging from armed sky marshals on flights to the 
deployment of new biometric technologies for the identification of passengers.  
 
While these initiatives may or may not be counterproductive, an association between 
global terrorism and hyper-mobility was forged by the destruction of the twin towers 
of the New York World Trade Center. Terrorists commandeered the civil transport 
infrastructure as a counter to the remote application of American power through 
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cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan. This subversion of a dominant 
technology by the marginalised had been foreshadowed by Johnston (2000) in his 
discussion of “blowback” from clandestine foreign policy interventions and by 
Lindqvist (2001) in his analysis of the development and application of military 
aviation in the twentieth century.  
 
The 9/11 attacks created a new understanding of the nature of co-presence and the 
dual use of technology. In the context of the unreflective application of technical 
superiority, particularly air-power, these acts represent a violent repositioning of 
concepts usually associated with the issues of the global divide and the information 
divide and the notion of appropriate and appropriated technologies (c.f. Little, Holmes 
and Grieco, 2001). Terrorists unexpectedly appropriated technologies of air transport 
to bridge the global divide and appropriated the global media to broadcast a gruesome 
message with the world’s undivided attention. 
 
Innovations in information and communication technologies facilitated the current 
mode of globalisation. Over shorter distances transportation and communication 
technologies were critical determinants of the western form of urban development and 
its variants within the global economy (Banham, 1960; 1971; Mazlish, 1965). The 
suburban railroad and tramway and the telephone and elevator allowed a combination 
of high-density business districts and lower density residential settlement. 
 
This model of urbanism became the mode of colonial and post-colonial urban 
development. In Hong Kong, for example, almost uniformly high density 
development is supported by a world class public transport system, but density also 
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creates problems for the prevention of disease transmission. The 2003 outbreak of 
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) was centred on four 35 storey high-rise 
block of flats in a district comprising nineteen in total. These contained 350 cases of 
SARS and were subject to quarantine. It was the vertical transportation within the 
blocks – the elevators –that turned out to be the key to the spread of infection. Local 
authorities delivered food and other supplies to the building, but the police eventually 
discovered that half of the occupants had fled. The governments of both China and the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region subsequently implemented quarantine 
camps for SARS patients. 
 
Before the emergence of SARS a range of transport and communication vectors had 
already been identified in the spread of infectious disease:  
• As an economy measure, airlines reduce the rate of cabin air change in long 
distance aircraft. This has been cited both as a vector for diseases and a 
contributing factor in passenger misbehaviour in the form of “air rage” 
(Andersen, 1999; Sahiar, 1994). 
• In addition to long-haul aviation, both long and short distance passenger rail 
transport in the United States have been identified as the vector for multiply 
drug resistant forms of tuberculosis originating in Siberia (Boseley, 2004; 
Reichman and Tanne, 2001).  
• Military grade anthrax has been distributed via the U.S., mail, one reason for 
initial speculation that SARS might be a form of bio-terrorism.  
 
Both new and old, now multiply resistant, communicable diseases will have as 
profound an impact on risk perception and choices for communication and transport 
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in this century as terrorism. While some argue that risk is a defining characteristic of 
the current period (Beck, 1992), in a broader historical context, we are returning to a 
more normal situation in which risk and mobility are intimately related. 
 
Govers and Go (2004) suggest that the response to the threat of SARS was 
disproportionate to the actual risk. The post 9/11 down-turn in air travel and the use of 
substitute forms of communication evident in the United States was driven as much 
by the potential disruption likely in the event of a second attack as by concern for 
direct individual danger. However, the rapid distribution of SARS via air 
transportation  and the draconian measures taken to control it at locations remote from 
its origin – in particular the impact on Toronto and the Canadian economy – ensured a 
significant response from urban populations in affected regions. 
 
Medical prophylaxis was as essential as the gun-boat to the extension of Western 
influence at the height of European colonial expansion, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Headrick, 1981). Without this protection, mortality rates ranging from fifty to 
seventy percent in West Africa confined Western presence to coastal trading 
settlements. Conversely western diseases to which indigenous populations had no 
resistance were critical in the undermining of existing cultures and patterns of trade 
and settlement in advance of direct contact with Western intruders (Reynolds, 1981).  
 
Currently the mobility of international labour as a component of the low wage service 
sectors of major urban centres bring fears of both disease and violence from the 
periphery to the core. For Western travellers, both the over-crowded short distance 
metro and the fully-booked long distance flight now holds risk not associated with 
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mobility for many years. These shifts in understanding of exposure to risk and disease 
can be examined usefully in terms first formulated by Perrow (1984). 
 
Mobility, Risk and Complexity 
 
Perrow introduces the concept of dread and attempts to improve upon cost-benefit 
analysis and its underlying economic rationality by considering cognitive and social 
rationalities too. 
 
Perrow is concerned to account for the difference in risk perception between the 
professionals responsible for the formal accounting of the risk inherent in large scale 
high technology projects and that of the general population exposed to that risk. He 
argues that people place some importance on the detail or manner of a fatality or 
accident, and do not confine their evaluation to the measurable outcomes of absolute 
rationality, that is the simple statistical probability of outcomes. He argues that these 
differences in formal and informal evaluation reflect a lay understanding of "disaster 
potential".  
 
Perrow draws on work reported by Pfund (1984) comparing the risk perceptions of 
expert risk assessors and a non-expert group. This shows that though a particular risk 
such as nuclear power might present few or no casualties in a given year, when non-
expert test subjects were asked to think about a "bad year", the respondents revealed 
an understanding of the scale of possible casualties in situations prone to systems 
accidents. 
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The test subjects were also able to rate the different activities in terms of criteria of 
voluntary participation, scientific understanding, familiarity, lethality etc very closely 
to the experts. However, the experts seemed not to regard characteristics such as 
"involuntary, delayed, unknown, uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, dreaded and 
fatal" (the rating of nuclear power) as relevant to the issue of riskiness of the activity 
while for lay observers these were significant considerations. 
 
Perrow presents the results of a larger follow up study of 90 hazards and 18 risk 
characteristics. Using factor analysis, three principal factors were identified: the most 
important was a "dread factor" which was discovered to be associated with: 
 
• lack of control over activity 
• fatal consequences of some sort of mishap 
• high catastrophic potential 
• reactions of dread 
• inequitable distribution of risks and benefits   
(including the transfer of risks to future generations) 
• the belief that risk is increasing and not easily reducible. 
 
The second factor was labelled "unknown risk" by the researchers and involved risks 
that are: 
 
• unknown 
• unobservable 
• new 
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• delayed in their manifestation. 
 
Examples given in 1984 were DNA research food irradiation and nuclear power. 
Clearly a current listing would include Deep Vein Thrombosis and SARS, plus 
potential bio-terrorism 
 
The third cluster consisted of risks characterised by "societal and personal exposure" 
such as motor vehicle accidents, smoking and pesticides, in which there is some 
degree of control over exposure. 
 
Perrow points out that all these criteria are characteristics of the complex and tightly 
coupled systems which are the focus of his book. Perrow identifies two dimensions: 
complexity and coupling. Linear systems are easier to manage than those that are 
complex and have unanticipated relationships between components. Loose coupling 
allows slack to deal with problems, tightly coupled systems immediately propagate 
the consequences of a mishap, and may turn it into a catastrophe. For Perrow systems 
which combine tight coupling with complex interactions are problematic. Features of 
the coupling and complexity described by Perrow are present in the urban regions of 
developed countries, for example, in the interaction between structural adjustment and 
the decline in public health standards in the developing countries which are delivering 
labour for the urban infrastructure. 
 
The narrow economic structural adjustment imposed by Western agencies on 
developing economies has reversed colonial and post-colonial public health gains 
(Bello, 1999). Migration patterns have delivered the consequences to the developed 
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world. Resistant strains of tuberculosis originating in the far eastern provinces of the 
former Soviet Union where health services, particularly in the prison system, have 
effectively collapsed had already been identified in New York and New Jersey. 
Corresponding reductions in the social wage have undermined health care delivery in 
developed economies so that the incomplete application of antibiotic drugs has 
increased the risk of established diseases through the creation of multiply drug 
resistant variants (NIC 2000). TB treatment is now delivered as directly observed 
therapy (DOT), to overcome the problems created by unsupervised antibiotic 
treatments. 
 
Other disease risks are emerging with global warming altering the distribution and 
range of a number of plant, animal and human diseases2. Speculation that pandemics 
may result from the release from polar ice of micro organisms that have not been in 
the atmosphere for hundreds of thousands of years take these concerns into the realms 
of Perrow’s dread factor. 
 
Bringing it All Back Home: Global Mobilities, Local Risks 
 
At the local level perceived risks from terrorism and from infectious diseases 
influence decisions about the use of urban mass public transport. At a global level the 
movement of populations in response to economic and social pressure and the 
consequent potential for the propagation of both disease and deliberate disruption is 
expected to continue to increase over the next decade (NIC, 2000, 2001). In assessing 
the risks to the United States from global migration up to 2015 the National 
Intelligence Committee identifies terrorist and organised crime groups exploiting co-
ethnic migrant flows and weak migration control.  
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Globalisation as currently understood (Ohmae, 1995; Dicken, 2003) proceeded from 
the mid- point of the twentieth century on the back of new information and 
communication technologies. Nineteenth century technologies had delivered 
regularity and predictability through the key technologies of steamship and electric 
telegraph (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Twentieth century technologies produced near 
instantaneous communication which created new forms of adjacency which offered to 
replace or supplement physical presence for many purposes.  
 
Large scale population movements and migration are driven by inequities in 
development. While tele-working has allowed the outsourcing of jobs from developed 
to developing locations, a counter-flow continues as evidenced by those casualties of 
9/11 who were engaged in key low-wage activities within the World Trade Center. 
This unevenness of development within and between economies threatens the 
achievement of sustainability as defined by writers such as Welford (1995) who cities 
the Bruntland report from the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Bruntland, 1987). 
 
Unevenness in development is reflected in the interpenetration of the developed centre 
and the periphery, in terms both of the coordination of dispersed activities through 
new communication technologies and the physical co-location of high and low value 
activities. The end of the Cold War allowed rapid acceleration of global economic 
integration. Disparate national and regional cultures are increasingly interacting 
within networked and globalised economic systems and organisations. Ohmae (1995) 
refers to the removal of the “bi-polar discipline” of the Cold War which had obscured 
 11
differences within and between members of the Eastern and Western blocs and 
consigned the remainder of humanity to the disparagingly termed “Third World”. 
Delamaide (1994) explores the synergies flowing from the re-assertion of historical 
cultural and economic linkages, offering an alternative understanding to Ohmae’s 
“zebra strategies” (Ohmae, 1995). Ohmae argues that governments should which play 
to the relative strength of the most developed components of national economies in 
order to create regional synergies. Delamaide suggests that emergent super-region of 
Europe represents the reactivation of much older pre-existing geopolitical 
relationships. The last minute restrictions on the free movement of new citizens of the 
twenty-five member European Union is to some degree an acknowledgement of both 
dynamics.  
 
From both perspectives, however, differentials in development are entrenched through 
dependence upon a global infrastructure constructed around the priorities of the 
dominant developed economies and the resulting inequities undermine the legitimacy 
of some national states. As a consequence, globalisation and deregulation of 
economies is producing nomadic communities. These are emerging in response to a 
complex process of layering of labour markets, both internal and external to the 
developed economies driving this process. Attali (1991) predicts the emergence of a 
nomadic international elite, in line with the examples provided by Webber (1964) but 
movement is not restricted to the elite employees of trans-national corporations. A 
range of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, legal and illegal are moving into 
and between both rural and urban areas of the more developed economies in growing 
numbers (Castles and Miller, 1993) 
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Migration patterns and improved physical and electronic communications have 
produced transcontinental extended families in all types of society, and the anxiety 
and confusion between categories such as asylum and economic migration point to the 
tensions produced by the growing scale of physical movement within the globalising 
system. Remittances from these workers to their relatives and dependants in the home 
country have become a significant component of global financial flows and they 
represent a very different form of global workforce from that posited in the mid 
twentieth century by writers such as Webber (1964). 
 
Workforce availability and cost in developed economies has been moderated by a 
degree of tolerance of illegal movement which has become institutionalised to a 
degree. According to Kling, Olin and Poster (1991) areas of Orange County, 
California, the quintessential Reaganite environment, are no-go areas to the INS 
(Immigration and Naturalisation Service). As economic migration has become 
conflated with asylum seeking with terrorism the permeability of U.S. borders has 
become a key concern 
 
Monitoring Mobility 
 
By the end of the first post Cold War decade it had become clear that a number of 
institutions were reassessing their roles, just as enforcement institutions shifted their 
attention from alcohol to other drugs after the repeal of prohibition laws in the United 
States (Grinspoon, 1994). The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA3) became 
involved in the development of data verification and encryption during the nineteen 
nineties, to the extent of proposing standards for commercial transactions which 
would enable them to monitor traffic. Information networks are emerging as the social 
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milieu of non-place communities. Policy veterans from the Cold War are viewing this 
non-space arena of global communications as their new fiefdom.  
 
The NSA proposals were vigorously opposed by groups such as Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR4). However, in the post 9/11 
environment calls for the electronic surveillance of either targeted groups, or entire 
civil populations have gained greater legitimacy. Electronic identity cards which had 
been promoted in the late nineteen eighties (Clarke, 1989) have again become the 
solution to the myriad problems of security and control. The need to identify SARS 
carriers has led to the deployment of infra-red scanning technologies to screen 
travellers for raised body temperatures. Developments in biometric technologies mean 
that iris recognition technology is being advanced for both technical reasons - greater 
accuracy than fingerprints - and cultural reasons - it only requires observation of the 
eyes, an advantage where individuals adhere to strict religious dress codes. 
 
Significantly the SARS outbreak triggered a co-ordinated global response. Both the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta5 and the World Health Organisation6 
provide on-line information on the progress of SARS. An overview of the threat and 
progress of SARS can be seen at the Globalchange site7 which makes a comparison 
between the responses of front-line health workers to the SARS threat to that of the 
front-line rescue workers on 9/11. 
 
The US Department of Defense maintains a Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 
and Response system8 and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) provides an 
Emerging Infection network9 which includes on-line courses. A world SARS map was 
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established by maptell.com10 and the measures put in place by various national 
governments were also published on the world wide web. The space, organization and 
management of the continuing response to SARS can be monitored from any point 
(Little and Grieco, in press). As a consequence the reappearance of SARS was met 
with a prompt and transparent response. 
 
In keeping with the globalised, distributed response, grid computing11 was being 
utilised in the analysis of SARS data, as with the SETI at Home distributed screen 
saver12 which harnesses the spare capacity of networked PCs in the search for extra-
terrestrial intelligence. 
 
Security is also premised on information tracking, control and metagovernance and, 
the most high profile information tracking and control arrangements are found in the 
War on Terror. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States 
maintains a web site13 which presents evidence and findings on-line and both the CIA 
view14 and the FBI view15 are readily available.  
 
However, these are countered by expressions of concern over the widening of 
definitions of "terrorism"16. The emergence of the al Jazeera news network17 has led 
to the provision of an English language version of their web site. This provides a 
contrast to the perspective and the images delivered by Western media. It represents a 
legitimate and selective use of dominant infrastructures in order to provide a voice for 
the excluded and demonstrates a reversibility of surveillance relationships. 
Recovery, Responses and Consequences 
 
 15
Terror and infection have become new sources of uncertainty in travel and 
communication and both are intertwined in the prospect of bio-terrorism. These 
threats are both inherent in travel, but also delivered through the movement of 
“others”. The propagation of terror and disease both reflect global mobilities 
facilitated by ICTs, the enabling technologies of a globalising economy. 
 
A military definition of security has been perpetuated from the cold war 
environment in which surveillance is combined with military intervention in order to 
achieve some form of stability.  
 
As a result of the civil-military communication problems on 9/11 the US civil Air 
Traffic control systems is now mirrored in real time at the air defence headquarters in 
Colorado Springs. The imperial origins of transport and communication 
infrastructures are described by Headrick (1981) and the military origins of the 
Internet have been well rehearsed, and are the key to its robustness. However, 
tensions between military and civil paradigms are implicit in the less obvious 
surveillance aspects of this infrastructure. The potential for a surveillance society 
through “dataveillance” was identified by Clarke, (1989).  
 
The civil paradigm draws on the fruits of 1980’s projects in artificial intelligence and 
“knowledge extraction” in the form of social network analysis (Carley and Gasser, 
1999). 
 
The military paradigm involves high tech weaponry and information warfare, ranging 
from electronic countermeasures to broadcast propaganda and ultimately cruise 
missile diplomacy. It remains a top down approach built on the assumption of the 
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ultimate superiority of high level abstract data. The US is promoting a “network 
centric defense” system among its allies. This complex and comprehensive military 
infrastructure depends upon a highly sophisticated and tightly integrated 
communication, command and control system. This in turn requires expensive 
specialised equipment constructed to standards dictated by the Pentagon. The United 
Kingdom is committing a significant proportion of its defence budget to achieve 
compatibility (Dawes, 2003). This decision is already impacting as “rationalisation” 
of front line units is proposed while these same units are engage in the deteriorating 
occupation of Iraq (Norton-Taylor and Watt, 2004). 
 
Regime change in Iraq was a policy which pre-dated the 9/11 attacks, and was 
integral to the Project for an American Century18 in which the United States was the 
only “superpower”. However, the post-9/11 “war on terror” was the justification for 
the invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Nation states, whether regarded as 
ideologically intransigent, corrupt or failing, are poor approximations of an 
amorphous and mobile enemy.  
 
Despite the US-led western occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorist attacks 
have continued within Muslim countries. The targets were mobile representatives of 
Western interests, whether tourists among the Indonesian minority Hindu population 
in Bali or business travellers around Western banks and consulates in Turkey a key 
secular Muslim country.  
 
Tourist travellers had already been targeted by a number of similar campaigns: from 
the separatist Kurdish movement within Turkey, ETA in pursuit of the cause of 
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Basque separatism in Spain and the IRA seeking economic disruption among the 
seaside resorts of mainland Britain. In the post-9/11 era, the tourist function of the 
major urban regions of the developed world is seen as another vector of vulnerability 
through which risk in the form of terror or disease can penetrate the core. 
 
Surveillance is being promoted as necessary to the management of permissive 
mobility in the twenty-first century. The United Kingdom has the largest population 
of electronically tagged offenders in the European Community – in excess of 10,000 - 
and is seeking the development of national identity cards. smart cards and ID cards.  
 
Transport innovations such as the smart cards pioneered in Hong Kong as Octopus 
and subsequently introduced in London as Oyster give opportunity for further 
monitoring in addition to credit card tracking and other forms of monitoring electronic 
transactions. A GPS locator function has been a requirement for all US cell phones 
since before 9/11. This allows tracking of the user to within a few metres. This facility 
can be used to deliver location specific services in high density environments, or for 
search and rescue in low density environments. It also permits extremely fine-grained 
real-time surveillance of the movement of selected individuals. 
 
Conclusion: another route to secure mobilities 
 
The collective global tracking of SARS offers a view of more forms of international 
co-operation than those driven by the war on Terror. New international relationships 
have emerged as the potential of the key technologies have become recognised. China 
is joining the European Galileo GPS system which offers an alternative to the U.S. 
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system and which is central to both mobile commerce and to security (People’s Daily, 
2003). This is an acknowledgement of the potential of a new form of digital divide in 
which the most developed surveillance systems – those of the United States and 
Britain - conduct real-time monitoring of global internet connectivity patterns creating 
a new definition of information rich and poor. 
 
However, many target populations exist with the more pressing problem of 
“information asymmetries” formulated by Lamberton (1995). This raises a wider 
problem than the “digital divide”. The former concept encompasses the significant 
proportion of humanity living in communities more than forty minutes travelling time 
from even basic telephonic communication: “information justice” is required 
(Lamberton, 1995), yet through current patterns of migration these populations may 
have only one or two degrees of separation from the urban heartlands.  
 
The ubiquity of the base technology of the Internet means that access to non-place 
community does not depend on large investment, nor on esoteric technical skills. 
Otherwise justifiable criticisms of technological optimism often miss this. ICTs 
already support the social and economic functioning of diasporic communities which 
bridge the global divides (Little Holmes & Grieco, 2000; 2001).  
 
The components of a bottom-up and networked response to the issues raised in this 
chapter are already in place. This new paradigm could provide the feedback loop of 
systems theory and cybernetics (Beer, 1981) which would facilitate the development 
 19
of an inclusive urbanism linking the core and the periphery. This would counter risk 
and build security though inclusion and engagement rather than deploying the same 
technology in the vain pursuit of security through an exclusion no longer possible in a 
globally networked urban form. 
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Notes 
1 Amoy Gardens is the 35 storey high-rise block of flats in Hong Kong in which some 
230 people were quarantined for 10 days during the 2003 SARS outbreak. 
2 The World Health Organisation suggests that “a temperature rise of only 1-2oC over 
the next 50 years could extend the range of malarial mosquitoes further north – 
increasing the proportion of the world's population at risk of malaria and other 
mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue and lymphatic filariasis” 
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